March 2018 – Monthly Commentary

March 2018

March has followed the pattern of the previous two months, with heightened equity market volatility creating worry for anxious investors. Despite that worry, the bond market has been a bastion of calmness with the 30-year bond trading in a relatively benign range of 3.22% to 3.00%. Given the continued strength of the U.S. economy, we had expected the bond to come under price pressure pushing the yield closer to 3.5%. That price action has been befuddling, especially given the steadily deteriorating budget deficit. On April ninth, the Congressional Budget Office announced that the deficit would likely hit $1 trillion dollars in 2020, two years sooner than earlier forecast. Investors didn’t blink an eye, which really is no surprise given the complacency that has swept over the public with regard to the U.S.’s profligate spending. The reaction was much the same last month when Republicans pushed through the $1.3 trillion spending bill.

American’s seem to have come to the conclusion that the Fed has and will continue to ensure prosperity for all and the idea of fiscal responsibility has become nothing more than an old fashioned notion. However, we got a glimpse of the future last month when the Treasury Department flooded the market with Treasury Bills. With the risk of a government shutdown earlier this year, Treasury reduced bill issuance in an attempt to stay under the borrowing cap. Because of the prospect of a shortage of T-bills, the yield to maturity in the secondary market plunged below the low end of the Fed Funds range. As a result, the Federal Reserve’s reverse repo program, which is available to select institutional clients and a de facto loan to the U.S. Government, skyrocketed to nearly $500 billion dollars. When a shutdown was averted and the debt cap lifted, Treasury issued nearly $300 billion in additional T-Bills, a 38% increase over the amount issued in February. As a result, T-Bill yields rose sharply and traded above the upper bonds of the Fed Fund range as investors sought to digest the additional supply.

With the increase behind us, T-Bills maturing in early June have fallen in yield by 15 basis points despite the rate hike in March and the expectation of another rate hike in June. The open interest in the reverse repo program also plunged from $500 billion at the peak to $4 Billion at the time of this writing, a nearly 100% plunge in open interest! The message here is that large moves in supply and demand will move the market, despite the Fed’s manipulation. It just so happened that with the freeze in the Bill market there was an alternative investment. We wonder who’s going to be the alternative source of buying when the Treasury is issuing a trillion dollars of additional debt year after year.

There are those who believe that should interest rates rise meaningfully in the face of supply, the Federal Reserve would restart their bond buying program to absorb the additional supply. While that may be sustainable in the near term, it’s a deeply flawed solution longer term for a number of reasons. First one trillion dollars is approximately 5% of GDP and as interest rates rise the compounding effect is going to cause the debt load to rise at an unsustainable pace. Secondly, as rates rise, the value of their existing portfolio is going to fall in value and that is likely to come under congressional scrutiny. Under the current spending regime both of those outcomes have a material probability of coming to pass. The fiscal irresponsibility of the U.S. Government resembles an individual getting caught up in the vicious circle of credit card debt. The debt is sustainable in the beginning but as spending exceeds income, it ultimately overwhelms the borrower.

In the history of money there have been numerous instances of countries pursing such a policy and in the vast majority of cases, the country was forced to either default on their debt, devalue their currency, or both. One has to wonder what will be the outcome for the U.S. dollar. It currently enjoys the status of being the world’s reserve currency and it’s bonds the store of wealth for many nations. That is unlikely to change overnight, but there’s a very good chance that it will erode. The big question is to what extent?

February 2018 – Monthly Commentary

February 2018

Six weeks ago, as we closed out January, the S&P 500 Index settled just below its all time high. Financial pundits
at the time were saying that a healthy correction would be good for the market. The term healthy correction
has always seemed an oxymoron. How can a decrease in the value of one’s investment portfolio be
described as healthy? Yet, the term has been in the lexicon of Wall Street for as long as traders have been
able to short stocks. The state of the market since the first of February is a telling example of the lunacy of a
healthy pullback. Stocks plunged more than 10% in the first two weeks of February and despite having
bounced off of the low, nervousness still abounds as witnessed by the sharp intraday spikes higher and lower.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that ETF’s were at least partly to blame for the panic. We’ve written on
numerous occasions of retail investors bemoaning that stock valuations were too high and rather than buying
expensive stocks, have invested in an ETF instead. To be clear, the SPDR S&P 500 ETF invests in every stock in the
S&P 500, even the overvalued ones. To maintain the correct proportions, the ETF manager must buy in the
open market. When demand rises for an ETF, the buying pressure lifts the entire market. Conversely, when
investors dump the ETF, the manager must dump all of the stocks and in the instances we saw in February, the
result is a precipitous drop in the overall market value. Compounding the selloff was an excessively large short
position in stock index volatility (VIX and VIX-like) products. These products have become a fad with active
traders and we believe that many of those trading them did not fully understand the ramification of the risk.
The VIX is a proxy for the expected annualized volatility of the S&P 500 and has traded mostly below 10% since
last summer. Investors had been collecting income by buying an inverse structured note that went higher in
price as implied volatility fell. Viewed as a “no brainer” money maker, retail investors piled in. The problem was
that when stock prices fell, implied volatility rose, inflicting losses on the VIX sellers. The market makers of the
products were forced to buy offsetting positions in the open market which pushed the value of implied volatility
higher and had the collateral effect of further spooking ETF holders. In short order a vicious circle developed
which drove the price of the broad market 10% lower in the course of a week. Happily, corporations stepped
in to buy back stock at a ravenous rate, staunching the selling and emboldening investors with the confidence
to do what they’ve been conditioned to do since 2009. Namely, buy the dip!

While not directly responsible for equity weakness, newly sworn-in Fed Chairman Powell made his first public
comments in testimony before Congress and his remarks were interpreted as being decidedly hawkish. Before
the testimony, consensus opinion was for three rate hikes this year, with some members of the FOMC arguing
that even that was too hawkish. Since the testimony, the market now reflects 100 basis points of tightening this
year including one later this month at the March 21st meeting. That has translated directly into higher interest
rates, with 3-month LIBOR crossing the magical two percent level. Also adding upward pressure to short
maturity interest rates is the sharply higher amount of new T-bill issuance coming to the market. As we’ve
discussed last month, the U.S. government is going to need to finance their continued excessive deficit
spending and that means more debt issuance.

Also catching the eye of investors was the rise in the yield of the 10-year note as it approaches 3%. This is the
third time since 2012 that the yield has approached 3% only to reverse direction. We’ll be watching that level
closely. Quite often in markets when a price, or in this case yield, breaks through a resistance level on its third
attempt, it usually follows through in meaningful way. If we get through 3%, we could very well see 3.5% before
too long.

January 2018 – Monthly Commentary

January 2018

The Federal Reserve, in managing the U.S. economy, is tasked with the dual mandate of ensuring full employment and stable inflation. The mandate is somewhat contradictory in that at full employment the tight labor force is likely to force wages higher which, in turn, risks pushing the overall level of inflation higher. That is, of course, if the numbers accurately reflect the actual rate of inflation, which we regularly argue is not the case. By focusing on an underreported rate of inflation the Fed has fallen dramatically behind in adjusting interest rates and now finds itself facing an overheating economy. Evidence is abundant in fourth quarter earnings reports, with strong revenue growth, rising cost of goods sold, and rising labor costs. In short, business is good but the cost of doing business is rising and output is at risk of being constrained by a shortage of goods and labor.

Prior to the most recent expansion, conventional wisdom held that the economy was operating at full capacity when the unemployment rate reached the theoretical level at which a further decline would cause a rise in inflation. The measure known as the Non-Accelerating Rate of Unemployment or NAIRU, was a completely subjective measure, but was considered to exist at approximately 5.2%. Economists would debate the precise level of NAIRU while bond traders sold bonds when unemployment approached the feared 5.2%. It was understood that the Federal Reserve would raise rates in advance of achieving full employment, so as to not let the inflation “genie” out of the bottle. Of course, that was thirty years ago and the inflation nightmare of the 1970’s was still fresh in the minds of most Americans. Fast forward to the current situation and the concept of NAIRU has all but disappeared. So much so that as we start the New Year and financial firms put forth their 2018 economic forecasts, some have called for the unemployment rate to fall below 3%. Applying the logic of NAIRU, if 5.2% unemployment is a sign of a strong economy, isn’t 3% a sign of an overheating economy? Despite that, the Fed continues to keep interest rates low, and notwithstanding the recent market volatility, the appetite for stocks remains strong. Indeed, the S&P 500 generated a positive return in every month last year; the first time that’s ever happened. Moreover, with the recently passed tax reform, corporations are likely to repatriate the vast sums of cash that they hold overseas. The hope of the President is that they’ll use those sums to fund research, development and expansion. The worry, instead, is that they will use the repatriated cash to buy back shares of their stock. We suspect that corporations will do a little bit of both. With every sector of the economy running at peak performance and the tax cuts putting more money in the pockets of consumers and corporations, and the stock buyback machine continuing to operate at full speed ahead, what could go wrong?

Investors have contemplated that question in the last several trading sessions and the answer seems to be concern that the Fed will finally begin to move more aggressively in raising rates. To be sure, the risk always exists that a mild selloff could develop into something more significant creating a material pull back in stock prices, greater than the 9% drawdown we’ve seen this month. But that’s seems unlikely to happen for two reasons. First, the Fed is not going to suddenly become hawkish. Despite the economy running at full capacity, there are some members of the FOMC that are still arguing against normalizing interest rates. Secondly, since 2009 the Pavlovian response to any market weakness has been to “buy the dip.” That goes for individual investors and corporate buybacks. But that’s not to say that stocks are cheap. We’d argue otherwise and that the selling is justified by the valuation. But anecdotally, the first quarter has started on a healthy note and there’s a very strong likelihood that first quarter earnings will surprise to the upside which is likely to embolden the bulls.

Then where is the risk? If the Fed is supportive of stock prices and there is a seemingly insatiable demand from investors, what could hurt the market? The answer is the hidden in plain sight, and it’s the climbing debt load. Every year during his eight years in office President Obama ran an enormous budget deficit. It became an issue for about a political “minute” when the now-defunct “Tea Party” Congressmen tried to fight it, but it’s since decidedly become a non-issue. So much so that the $1.5 trillion price tag for the Trump tax cut was merely a minor issue in negotiations. Currently the value of outstanding U.S. government debt stands at $20 trillion, that’s more than double the size of the debt when Obama took office. And with some forecasting $1 trillion annual deficits in the coming years, the bond market could be headed toward a point of saturation. The biggest question of all will be how the Fed will respond if the saturation point comes at the same time that inflation becomes a problem. The bigger question is how close are we to that point?

December 2017 – Monthly Commentary

December 2017

While the team at Halyard evaluates the economic and market backdrop on a daily basis, we like to commit those thoughts to paper periodically, and especially so as we kick off the new year. Our starting premise this year is that the United States economy closed out 2017 with unmitigated strength. From a sector by sector perspective, we’re delighted to find the strength was broad based and not concentrated in any one sector or industry.

While too early to tally the result of the just ended holiday selling season, it’s seems likely that retail sales set a record with internet sales clogging the delivery channels late in December. Holiday shopping seems to have been forever changed, as the madness of black Friday has decidedly been replaced by cyber Monday which really was more like cyber December. Many of the individuals with whom we spoke said they happily avoided visiting the mall altogether this year. Nonetheless, sales were strong and UPS, FedEx, Amazon, and Walmart took an outsized share of the spoils. The very high level of consumer confidence and the robust jobs market were directly responsible for the success of the season as consumers felt confident about their prospects for job retention and wage growth.

Consumer confidence also benefited the housing market as new home sales sold at a pace not seen since pre-crisis. Despite the uptick in sales, new home construction is still well below the peak rate registered in 2005, which should be supportive of further industry gains. Moreover, the builders have carefully managed inventory to avoid a repeat of the oversupply witnessed during the peak. Similarly, the inventory of existing home sales continues to dwindle as sales outpace offerings. With the relative tightness of inventory, home prices, as measured by the Case Shiller index, closed the year with a 6.3% annual rise in price. The phantom wealth gain of rising home prices is contributing to a virtuous circle of ebullient consumer confidence and their propensity to spend.

Manufacturing continued its renaissance as the sector continued to grow, adding 79,000 new employees in the fourth quarter and registered employment gains in every month of 2017 save one. That’s a pleasant change from the month after month job cuts witnessed in the 2000’s.

With the backdrop of full employment and strong consumer confidence we believe the economy will continue to expand at least at a moderate pace. Moreover, as the Trump tax cuts work their way through the economy, the potential exists that the moderate growth could expand into a consistently greater than 3% annualized GDP growth. That’s a scenario that we believe would alarm the Federal Open Market Committee and perhaps cause them to consider more aggressive tightening. For the foreseeable future, however, we expect they will continue on the path of slow and steady rate hikes with three or four hikes in the coming year. Similarly, we expect that their bond purchase tapering will continue at the stated pace. One nuance that could be changed is the mix of asset purchases related to the recent flattening of the yield curve. Much talk has focused on the yield curve flattening as portending a recession or at best resulting in a drag on the financial sector. In thinking about the flattening, it’s important to keep in mind that it’s a direct result of the Fed’s manipulation of interest rates in the open market. It’s also important to remember that the Fed has an open dialogue with the money center bankers and considers their concerns when developing monetary policy. Given those considerations, we would not be shocked if the Fed decided to buy less of the longer maturities and allow that rate to drift higher, thereby steepening the yield curve. The challenge they face, should they decide to follow that course of action would be the size of the reduction and to what level they would like to see the yield curve move.

As for our portfolio construction, we continue to be of the mind that interest rates are too low and long duration exposure should be avoided. Currently we’re keeping maturities under three years and focusing heavily on floating rate notes. With the expectation that the Fed will continue to tighten, floaters will perform well as their coupon adjusts higher with each rate hike, thereby anchoring their price at close to par. Finally, given the relative expensiveness of riskier assets, we are limiting our exposure to investment grade corporate and municipal issuers while avoiding European banks, emerging market debt, and high yield issuers.

November 2017 – Monthly Commentary

November 2017

In 2004, an acquaintance left his job as a banking clerk to become a real estate sales agent. Almost overnight his income doubled as the homes he represented sold briskly. The market was so hot that he was working seven days a week and his income soared well over $200,000. However, in 2006 sales began to slow and buyers were grumbling that home prices had grown out of reach. Builders continued to build new homes, albeit at a diminished pace, and realtors aggressively argued that all was well in the market. The neophyte real estate broker, in an effort to sustain his business added a “click-through” to his website entitled the “anti-bubble argument.” When clicked, a series of charts popped up comparing home prices to a number of measures, concluding that not only was real estate not in a bubble, but the opposite was true. To not buy would be to miss out on the next leg of another profitable run in home prices. His logic was that if he could convince his clients that U.S. home prices were going higher, he’d be able to ensure that his recent uptick in income would continue. Of course, that wasn’t to be and he is now blissfully, though less profitably, operating a boutique organic vegetable farm. I was reminded of his anti-bubble argument as I listened to the parade of investors and traders on the financial news program one recent morning. One after another, the experts agreed that stock prices are expensive and the risk level elevated, but each suggested looking past valuation so as to not miss the next leg up in prices. They are engaging in the same attempt at deception as the real estate agent. The profitability of their employers depends on investors remaining invested in their funds. When pressed on the matter of valuation, the usual retort is to say that they mitigate the downside by focusing on high growth stocks or defensive stocks, or some combination of both. We see many similarities between the current stock market and the 2006 Real Estate market. It impossible to know for how much longer the stock rally will last, but by nearly every measure, stock prices are expensive.

We’ve written on several occasions about our frustration with government reported data and the release of the October consumer price index (CPI) is another stark reminder of why. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that headline CPI rose 2.0% year-over-year, decelerating from the 2.2% pace recorded the previous month. Often we’ve said that the muted CPI seems directly at odds with the rising cost of living of the average American. Digging into the details of the report offers a glance as to why and we reference several components to illustrate the point. The first is shelter, which constitutes 33% of the index. The economic profession looks to the Case Shiller national index as the definitive measure of home price inflation and the last reading was a 6.07% rise in home prices year-over-year. That’s far higher than the 3.2% change measured in CPI. Adjusting for the actual change in home prices would add approximately 0.71% to the top line inflation measure. The next items we question are medical care and health insurance, rising 1.9 and 0.2%, respectively. Unlike home prices, there is no definitive data to substitute for these items, but one can attest that when co-pay and co-insurance are factored in the cost of a visit to the doctor, and the staggering annual increase in insurance premiums, health insurance costs are rising far faster than the ridiculous rates suggested by the BLS. Finally, according to the BLS the cost of telephone and internet services fell -7.1% and -1.0% year-over-year, respectively. Regarding those two items, the BLS has said the move to unlimited data earlier this year would result in a falling adjusted price when the additional service is considered. In essence, they’re saying that you’re getting more for your money so that’s deflationary. I can tell you that neither the cost of our phone nor the cost our internet access has fallen. Ever! To solve for the inaccuracies presented by the BLS, we made a number of subjective statistical adjustments that are in no way definitive, but nevertheless, we believe are more reflective of price changes. Based on those adjustments we believe the year over year change in the cost of living is closer to 3.25% rather than the 2.0% report by the BLS. By that measure, the real return on the 10-year Treasury note would be -0.85%.

October 2017 – Monthly Commentary

October 2017

Last month marked the 30th anniversary of Black Monday, October 19, 1987, prompting us to take a look back at how the Dow Jones Industrial Average has evolved since that infamous day. Of the 30 stocks in the index at the time, Bethlehem Steel, Eastman Kodak, GM, Union Carbide, U.S. Steel, and Woolworths have all gone through bankruptcy. Some reorganized and reemerged, but most didn’t. Sears, which also was part of the index in 1987 is quite likely to be gone in the next six months. Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) was not in the index, but as the leader in mainframe computer production, it was the premier technological company at the time. Unfortunately for DEC investors, the utilization of mainframes dwindled as minicomputers sales soared, and a significantly diminished DEC was bought by Compaq computer in 1998. At the time of the time of the DEC purchase, Compaq was a pillar of the tech industry, and together with Dell, Microsoft, Intel and a host of other tech companies were represented in virtually every growth portfolio. Four years later, Carly Fiorina, the one-time Presidential hopeful and then Chairwoman of Hewlett Packard engineered an $87 Billion “friendly” merger between HP and Compaq. The integration of the two companies did not go well and it wasn’t long before investors were punishing the stock which, in turn, led to the ousting of Ms. Fiorina.

One would think that such woeful performance would weigh heavily on investors as they evaluate the riskiness of the current stock market as it rallies to new highs on a nearly daily basis. Last month we wrote about Warren Buffet’s proclamation that the Dow index would probably hit 1,000,000 in the next 100 years. The “Oracle of Omaha” in his promotion of buy and hold investing, didn’t mentioned that the Dow Jones Index is not a buy and hold index and regularly drops underperforming companies. The theory of a buy and hold portfolio completely ignores what to do when a company starts to show financial strain or loss of competitive advantage. To hear Buffet tell it, investors would be best served by buying and never selling. However using the 1987 Dow Jones index as a proxy for a buy and hold portfolio, an investor in that index would have had 20% of their 1987 portfolio fall to zero. Of course that’s taking portfolio construction to an extreme and the investor would have been well served by simply rebalancing their portfolio to mirror the new index components. The point is, setting it and forgetting it, as Mr. Buffet suggested, is a perilous plan; and that goes for the bond market as well. With interest rates pegged at artificially low rates and credit spreads at the low end of their long term range, it’s easy to be lulled into a false sense of security. We see it in abundance across the various sectors, both domestically and internationally, high yield and investment grade, emerging market and sovereign debt. Driven by the incessant search for yield, appetite for return is forcing investors to take risks that aren’t commensurate with the measly returns offered. While it’s plausible that the low rate environment could last for the foreseeable future, we believe that investors will ultimately be punished for imprudent investing.

Turning to the economy, data reported during October painted a picture of unmitigated strength. The litmus test for economic health is the labor market and despite hurricanes Irma and Harvey-related hiccoughs, the economy continues to create jobs at a rapid pace. The unemployment rate fell to 4.1% as 261,000 new jobs were gained in October, and the prior month’s job figure was revised higher by 51,000. Equally encouraging was the 3.0% GDP growth rate registered in the third quarter. Economists had warned that the aforementioned hurricanes were likely to trim as much as one percent from that growth rate and were shocked to see the three “handle”. To summarize the state of the U. S. economy, the labor market is at full employment, manufacturing is booming as is the tech sector, inventories are lean, and home builders can’t build houses as fast as they’d like because of a shortage of workers. Historically, at this stage of the economic cycle, the Fed would have overnight interest rates at a level 75 to 125 basis points above inflation. That would translate to a short term rate somewhere between 3.00% to 3.50%, instead of the 1.25% level at which it currently stands. Our concern is that the economy is at risk of a spike in wage growth that spooks the Fed and it’s bevy of new governors and they respond by speeding up the pace of rate hikes or more sharply curtailing the quantitative easing still in place. That would undoubtedly destabilize stock and bond prices. As we said earlier, investors will ultimately be punished for imprudent investing.

September 2017 – Monthly Commentary

September 2017

Signs of excess abound in the capital markets as the ongoing emergency monetary policy supports frothiness and exuberance at every turn.  Last month, billionaire Warren Buffett commented that he wouldn’t be surprised if the Dow Jones Industrial Index, currently valued at 22,600, climbed to 1,000,000 in the next one hundred years.  In making that audacious prediction, Mr. Buffett seemed to be showing unbridled confidence in the stock market.  However, solving for the average return, a mere 4% compounded annually would take the index to 1,000,000 in 2117.  Since 1928, the average annual return for the index was has been approximately 11.4%, or nearly three times that expected by Buffet.  To measure the variation around that average return, statisticians look to the standard deviation, which for the same period was approximately 19.7%.  Sparing the reader the calculations and explanations, that standard deviation implies that an investor can expect, with near certainty, that the return of the Dow Jones average will be between and -47% and 70%.  That’s an enormous range, but reflective of what has been witnessed since 1928.  The worst year was -43% in 1931 and the best year was 52% in 1954.

At this point the reader may be wondering why an investment firm specializing in fixed income cares about the risk/return profile of stocks.  The short answer is that stock prices are one of the macro factors that impact interest rates.  What prompted our thinking was the collapse of implied volatility imbedded in S&P500 option prices, often referred to as the VIX, or as the media likes to call it, the fear index.  On September 21st, the day after the FOMC meeting, the implied volatility on S&P 500 options touched 6%, one of the lowest levels ever witnessed.  To put that into context, let’s assumes that for the next for the next 100 years the average expected return of the S&P 500 will be 11.4% as it was for the last 100.  If so, that 6% implied volatility is indirectly saying that you can expect the stock market to generate between -7% and 29% with near certainty.  Of course, the options we’re talking about expire in two weeks, not 100 years.  But the concept is the same and illustrates the ridiculous degree of complacency that’s crept into the capital markets.

The irony is that the media had been abuzz in September with continued nuclear saber-rattling out of North Korea, the catastrophic results of two category 5 hurricanes, the worst earthquake in Mexico in over 30 years, and hawkish language from the Federal Reserve.  To further drive home the irrationality of the capital markets on that same September day that implied volatility bottomed, pundits were pointing to the yield differential between the 5-year and 30-year Treasury notes as indicating that a recession is looming.  If a recession is looming, stock prices should be a whole lot lower, and implied option volatility a whole lot higher.  Recall that in a recession profits recede from their previous high and the price/earnings ratio of those earnings contracts, taking stock prices lower.

We do not share the view that the U.S. is at risk of recession, but we are of the opinion that stock prices are overvalued, especially if interest rates rise, which seems likely, albeit at a very slow pace.  With that opinion and the exceptionally low cost of option protection, now may be a good time to hedge one’s equity portfolio.

August 2017 – Monthly Commentary

August 2017
On August 2 the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee (TBAC) released, via the U.S. Treasury Department website, its roadmap for reducing the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. The TBAC is a liaison of senior members of money center banks and investment firms and the Treasury Department. The goal of the group is to keep the Treasury informed as to the thinking of the largest buyers of U.S. Government debt. Typically, the group focuses on supply and demand trends and the appetite for Treasury bills, notes, and bonds, and other matters concerning government debt. But the most recent report was much more surprising in that it laid out a plan for how the Federal Reserve is expected to unwind the roughly $4.5 trillion in Treasury bonds and Mortgage-backed securities the Fed has bought over the years.

The first expectation that surprised us was that the TBAC would view a reduction of Treasury holdings to $1.7 trillion from the current $2.5 trillion as a return to normalization. We had anticipated a balance sheet of well below $1 trillion.
The second surprise was that as the mortgage-backed securities mature, the proceeds would be reinvested into Treasury Bills. In doing so, the Fed would reduce their MBS holdings at a faster pace than they’d be reducing their Treasury holdings. Nevertheless, to invest maturity proceeds in Bills is continued quantitative easing, and arguably irresponsible monetary policy. The group did not offer insight as to how long they expected the bill reinvestment to continue.

The third surprise was that the group anticipates that once the Fed reaches its normalized balance sheet, the Central Bank will reinvest maturing Treasuries on a pro-rata basis across the yield curve in the amount of $100 to $200 billion per year. As with the reinvestment of MBS into Treasury bills, this is not normalization but continued quantitative easing.

The fourth eyebrow raising item, not so much of a surprise as a revelation, was the expectation for budget deficits in the near term. The TBAC expects that the U.S. Government budget deficit will again rise above $1 trillion by 2020. That’s nearly double the official administration forecast and represents a sizeable amount of additional bonds that will need to be absorbed by the market. Of course, if the government plans to continue to print dollars to buy a portion of that debt, the burden is eased somewhat.

After reading the 42 page report which offers a degree of granularity that has not been detailed by the Federal Reserve, the obvious question is what impact will the expectations have on the market if they come to pass? The TBAC delineated those risks in three tidy parts. Part one is where we currently find ourselves; declining bond risk premium, with a corresponding decline in credit spreads, reflective of investors reach for yield in a low interest rate environment. Part two forecasts a partial reversal of part one, and envisions that a small increase in yield could result in an accelerating rise of risk premium. Part three is described as simply “Let markets clear.” The group anticipates that under this scenario a meaningful decline in risk assets would occur but that it wouldn’t pose a systemic problem. We assume that by systemic risk the group is referring to banks and given the build-up in Tier 1 capital and on-going stress testing, they would probably be right. But given the trillions of dollars that have been plowed into every sector of the bond market and the lofty valuations in the stock market, investors would likely take a massive hit. Those investors, many of whom are rapidly approaching retirement, would instantly pull back spending, and with that, pose a high likelihood of tipping the economy into recession. Of course the Fed could save us from a deep recession by cutting interest rates sharply as they have done in past recessions. The only problem is that they can’t follow their traditional playbook because there is only one percentage point between the current rate and zero. Alternatively, they could again crank up quantitative easing, except that they’re still engaged in quantitative easing and to accelerate the program would be to expand their already growing balance sheet at an even faster rate. The Fed has backed monetary policy into a corner and the Wall Street elite, as represented on the TBAC, have illustrated that in their most recent report. Only they don’t want to offend the Fed and suggest that when they let markets clear that it won’t be systemic. It may not be systemic, but you can bet your bottom dollar that it will be painful.

July 2017 – Monthly Commentary

July 2017

The equity market remained a bastion of tranquility in July as the S&P 500 rallied 1.9% and the volatility index (VIX) touched an all-time low of 8.84 late in the month. A telling example of the complacency was on display in a Bloomberg TV interview. The analyst being interviewed was asked how she could offer a buy recommendation on a stock with such a lofty Price/Earnings ratio. The analyst responded that yes, the stock price is expensive from a P/E perspective, but not as expensive as other stocks in the industry. We worry that when analyst’s start justifying buy recommendations on expensive stocks based on relative value, the market is at risk.

Similarly, bonds posted a benign month, with 2-year interest rates a few basis points higher and ten-year notes a few basis points lower. All eyes were on the Federal Reserve mid-month in anticipation that Chair Yellen would further flesh out the start date of balance sheet reduction. But rather than offer details, she stressed that the Fed would move slowly in normalizing policy. Despite that, we expect that the start date is likely to be detailed at the September meeting and will commence in October.
In the foreign exchange market, the action was anything but benign. The Euro staged an impressive rally, rising 3.36% in price, finishing the month at 1.1811. Recall that at the start of this year the cost to buy one Euro stood at $1.04 and the vast consensus was that the cost would ultimately fall below $1.00. The logic had been that with negative interest rates in Europe, investors and savers would sell the Euro and buy U.S. Dollars to earn the interest rate differential. As we’ve written previously, that logic is flawed due to cross-currency interest rate arbitrage. Nonetheless, there seemed to be more than enough of those Europeans in search of yield to push the value of the Euro down to near parity. In hindsight, that had become a very crowded trade and with European economic prospects brightening, the Euro shorts needed to cover. As we mentioned in last month’s update, ECB Chief Mario Draghi briefly floated the idea of trimming the emergency quantitative easing in which the central bank has been engaging.

At the time of this writing, we are about half way through Q2 corporate earnings, and they have been broadly positive, which has further served to support stock prices higher. The problem is that stock prices have reached nosebleed levels as measured by the Price/Earnings ratio. The current 2017 estimated P/E for the S&P 500 stands at approximately 19 times earnings. While elevated by historical standards, the divergence of the 500 stocks in the index brings to mind the adage that one can drown in a lake that on average is only two feet deep. That is to say that the average P/E masks the wide valuation divergence among stocks in the index. For example Intel, Ford, and General Motors, to name a few, trade well below that average, while so-called large cap value stocks like Procter and Gamble, Colgate, MMM, and John Deere all trade well above it. We sarcastically refer to the large caps as value stocks because at current prices we see no value at all. Each of the four stocks has suffered a decline in revenue over the last four years. A quick and dirty measure of value is the Profit/Earinngs ratio divided by the Growth rate (PEG) ratio. As a rule of thumb, a PEG ratio of one offers fair valuation for slow growing corporations and the ratio rises for faster growing companies. Logically investors are more willing to pay a higher price for a faster growth. Why, then, do we have slow growth companies trading at a PEG ratio of four. We believe that the answer is index fund buying. Since those companies represent large weightings in the S&P 500, they represent a bigger share of the index and hence a bigger resultant purchase when an investor buy an S&P index fund. When demand for index funds explodes as it has in recent years, demand for those shares correspondingly explodes. In essence, the index fund managers become price insensitive buyers. In that sense, who cares how expense the underlying stocks are; they need to be purchased. Price insensitive buying rarely ends well!

June 2017 – Monthly Commentary

June 2017

We knew it had to come at some time, but the elusive question has always been when?  The question we refer to is when the European Central Bank (ECB) would finally signal that they were going to ease off of ultra-stimulative monetary policy.  At the late June press conference ECB President Mario Draghi took the first step, albeit a tiny one, and hinted that quantitative easing could be tapered at some point in the future.  Recall that when the Federal Reserve first broached the subject of pulling back from emergency monetary policy in 2013, investors staged what has been dubbed a “taper tantrum,” in which the U.S. 30-year Treasury yield skyrocketed by 110 basis points in the two months that followed.  Compared to the U.S., the Europeans reaction was far more muted.  Since Draghi’s comments, the German 30-year yield is 38 basis points higher and the DAX index of German stocks is less than 1% away from its all time high.  Hardly a tantrum!  Nonetheless, a day after the comment, ECB sources said that markets took the words out of context and that the central bank is not currently considering reducing the stimulus program.

Further adding to investor confusion, Bank of England Chairman Mark Carney explicitly said that the U.K Central Bank would need to raise interest rates in the not too distant future.  Moreover, he described the global recovery as having become “broad-based.”  Although, he followed that by saying the BOE would “wait and see” how the economy develops which we translate as suggesting that a rate hike will not occur this summer.  Rounding out the suddenly hawkish tone of policy makers, Carney’s previous employer, the Bank of Canada raised their overnight lending rate for the first time in seven years this month.

Undoubtedly, the comments and actions of the various Central Banks are a departure from the accommodative policy that’s been in place since the financial crisis.  However, we anticipate that they’ll follow the Federal Reserve and reverse policy at a glacial pace.  Despite that, we expect that market volatility will likely tick higher as investors attempt to decipher how soon and by how much interest rates will rise.  In doing so, it’s important to understand that as global central banks begin to back away from emergency monetary policy they are not actually tightening policy.  The ECB and BOE are suggesting that they will slow their buying of assets while the Fed is planning on reinvesting less of the interest and maturity payments generated from their portfolio.  All three will continue to buy assets in the open market, thereby impacting prices and keeping interest rates artificially low.  It they were to endeavor to tighten policy, they would be outright sellers of securities held in their portfolio.

The Fed laid out its plan for balance sheet reduction at the conclusion of the last FOMC meeting.  Their plan is to trim reinvestment by $10 billion in the first three months after implementing the operation (when that will be has not been communicated), with the reduction split between Treasury notes and mortgage-backed securities, 60% and 40% respectively.  They plan on increasing that amount to $20 billion in the next quarter, and continuing to increase by $10 billion each quarter, until they top out at $50 billion a quarter.  The stated intention is to keep the 60%/40% ratio throughout the operation.  When the Fed ultimately reaches $50 billion a quarter, the annual amount of proceeds not reinvested will represent about 4.5% of their total portfolio.  Of course, they will be shrinking the portfolio at about half that rate because their existing holdings will continue to generate income of about 2% a year on the remaining balance.  The point is that it’s unlikely that the Fed portfolio will return to pre-crisis levels for a very, very long time.