May 2012

Risk aversion returned to the capital markets last month, as investors struggled to understand the fate of European monetary union. The fear was most evident in the exodus of Euro-denominated assets out of European banks and into the U.S. dollar. Spanish banks bore the brunt of the capital outflow, with an estimated 100 billion Euros leaving Spain. As a result, the dollar appreciated more than 6.5% versus the Euro during the month. The U.S. bond market benefited directly from that dollar flow, with the yield on 10-year Treasury notes falling to 1.56% from the 1.94% level at which it started the month. The panic was magnified in the stock market as the S&P 500 lost 6% for the month.

Compounding investor worry, the May employment report showed that the U.S. economy added 69,000 jobs during the month, well below the already subdued estimate of 150,000. To be certain, the deceleration in job growth has caught us by surprise. It seems that the ongoing uncertainty surrounding domestic fiscal policy is slowing what was shaping up to be an accelerating recovery. Based upon that assumption, we have downgraded our growth assumption. We started this year with a forecast that 2012 GDP growth would register 2.75% to 3%. It now seems likely that GDP will come in closer to 2.0%. However, while we expected a slower rate of economic growth, we do not believe that the U.S. economy will slip into recession. Despite the downgrade of our growth forecast, our investment thesis has not changed. We deem interest rates to be artificially and significantly depressed and credit to be cheap. Moreover, with the cost to hedge quite low and the payoff ratio so attractive, our short-term interest rate hedge continues to be an integral component of the fund. In addition, we continue to find interesting opportunities in credit, especially in the municipal bond sector.

While May proved to be a difficult month for developed markets, the collateral damage sustained by emerging market investments in both equities and fixed income was even more substantial. The currencies of Brazil and India were down approximately 6% versus the U.S. Dollar, while the Mexican Peso plunged nearly 10% for the month. For equity investors, the loss was exacerbated by stock markets that were down by 4% to 6% for the month. Emerging market investments were the darlings of the brokerage community just a few months back, touted as offering a higher yielding alternative to developed markets with the added benefit of an appreciating currency. As we’ve discussed previously, an unhedged investment in emerging market debt generates fixed income-like return with equity-like risk. In other words, investors are not paid to take on the added risk.

Despite the red ink that flowed in the latter half of May, the month was not devoid of good news. Several measures of housing activity registered better than expected, including surprise increases in housing starts, existing home sales, and new home sales. Also of note, there were several credit positive events during the month, the most significant being the upgrade of Ford Motor to investment grade. Ford has suffered as a sub-investment grade credit since July 2005, which meant that their access to credit markets was limited and their cost of borrowing significantly higher. To celebrate their elevation to investment grade status, the carmaker issued $1.5 Billion in 5-year notes at a spread of 230 basis points above Treasury notes. That’s approximately 100 basis points tighter than where Ford paper traded just six months prior.

Another “fallen angel” returned to the market during the month, much to our surprise. Late in the month AIG came to market with $750 million in 10-year notes at yield spread of 325 basis points above Treasury notes. Surprisingly, since issuance, the paper has appreciated with the spread above treasury notes falling to 304 basis points. We did not participate in the purchase and are not anticipating holding AIG paper any time soon. In purchasing a bond, we need to feel comfortable that the borrower is willing and able to repay the bond at maturity. We’re not comfortable that AIG meets either of those criteria.

April 2012

As we conclude another robust earnings season, media attention has fixated on select weaker economic data, while ignoring economic strength. In the previous two years, global economic activity has slowed as spring arrived in the northern hemisphere. Anticipating a third consecutive year of second quarter weakness, investors over the last six weeks have reacted by selling stocks and buying Treasury notes. Again this year, the insidious phrase “sell in May and go away” is freely offered as a sensible investment strategy. Given that backdrop, the month was characterized by a flight to U.S. Treasury notes, with the Yield-to-maturity of the 10-year note falling 30 basis points, closing out the month at 1.91%.

Indeed, the list of potential stock rally-ending events is worrying. The ongoing fiscal and growth issues in Europe are first and foremost. From the continent, fears include of the willingness and ability of Spain and Italy to close their yawning budget deficits without sending the European south into a deep recession. Also of concern is the willingness of Francois Hollande, the newly elected President of France, to follow the path of economic unity established by former President Sarkozy and German Chancellor Merkel. Yet another worry, though to a much lesser extent, is the ongoing problems in Greece. With the country lacking leadership, the risk of an exit from the Euro is rising, although the damage would be minimal compared to the risk that existed last year. Offsetting those concerns, the risk that the European banking sector posed last year has been mitigated by the Long Term Repo Operation funding implemented by the European Central bank.

While investors grappled with fear that economic growth in Europe would spillover to the United States, the Federal Reserve expressed a less accommodative tone and suggested that the possibility of a third round of quantitative easing was less likely. At the conclusion of the April 25th Federal Open Market Committee meeting, Chairman Bernanke described monetary policy “as being approximately in the right place at this point.” Moreover, the committee was quoted as seeing “some signs of Improvement” in the housing sector with the expectation that housing activity would “pick up gradually.” In addition to less accommodative language, the forecasts presented by the Federal Reserve members reflected an upgraded expectation for economic growth. Their forecast for the unemployment rate at year-end 2012 is now 7.8% to 8.0%, a significant reduction from the 8.2% to 8.5% forecast that was presented in January. Even more surprising was the change in their Fed Funds forecast. The Chairman continues to guide investor perception to a 0.25% Fed Funds rate until late 2014. However of the 17 forecasts, only 4 members now expect Fed Funds to remain at 0.25% through 2014 and only 7 members forecast a rate below 1.0% at that time.

Also commanding attention has been a marginal slowdown in economic activity that began in March and continued through April. It now appears that the mild winter pulled activity forward at the expense of second quarter growth. The most glaring example is the slowing rate of job creation. After adding an average of 250,000 jobs in December, January, and February, job growth over the last two months has been 166,000 and 130,000 respectively. We believe that the slowdown in job creation will be temporary and are already seeing evidence of improvement in the weekly unemployment insurance claims rate. After spiking briefly in April, initial claims have again drifted lower, seemingly indicating that job growth is again gaining steam. Another measure of the job market is the Jobs Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, known as JOLTS. The JOLTS survey presents the total number of jobs currently available but not yet filled. In March that figure climbed to 3.737 million jobs, the highest level since July 2008. Digging deeper into the report every category, save government, saw an increase in help wanted.

As we commence this month, we think to sell in May, or to buy into the Treasury rally, would be a mistake. Economic activity continues to improve with the housing market showing signs of bottoming, gas prices have eased, and U.S. manufacturing continues to enjoy a renaissance. Moreover, as the Federal Reserve’s manipulation of Treasury note prices concludes at the end of June, a very large marginal buyer will exit the market. We wouldn’t be surprised to see investors sell Treasury securities in advance of the end of that program. Certainly, investors will continue to be subject to heightened volatility caused by “tape bombs,” as market moving bad news is known on Wall Street. However, we don’t expect that to derail the accelerating recovery in the United States.

March 2012

Looking past the noise of day-to-day market volatility, the investment climate has improved markedly since the end of 2011. The feared collapse of the global banking system has faded with European Central Bank’s Long Term bank funding operation and, while Greece was unable to avoid default, the write-down of Greek debt occurred without the messy contagion that was feared. Given that improved backdrop, investors have pushed the price of the S&P 10% higher through the end of March. Comparatively, the bond market correction has been marginal, at best.

Despite fading systemic risks, economic fundamentals continue to take a back seat to the confusing message coming from the Federal Reserve. Investors have been on edge trying to guess what Chairman Bernanke and his fellow Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members are going to say or do. The events of the last few weeks offer a glaring example. Prior to the March thirteenth FOMC meeting, consensus opinion was that the Fed was on the verge of launching additional monetary stimulus. Despite a public debate among Fed presidents concerning the need for additional action, Bernanke, in testimony and interview, eluded that such action was imminent. Investors were shocked that no such action was announced as the meeting concluded and the summary statement was issued. Like a spoiled child denied, investors threw a tantrum and sold stocks and bonds, driving the price of both down sharply. Responding to the ensuing criticism Mr. Bernanke took the highly unusual step of launching a public relations campaign, in an effort to explain why the Fed has kept monetary conditions especially easy and the rationale for additional easing, should they decide to pursue QE3. The first stop was a prime time interview with Diane Sawyer on the ABC evening news. The Chairman’s message was that growth has been modest, unemployment too high, and that he doesn’t want to repeat the mistakes made by the Central Bank during the Great Depression. Overall, the interview did little to instill confidence. The next stop of the campaign was an engagement to teach an undergraduate business class at The George Washington University titled “The Aftermath of the Crisis.” The class offered a before, during, and after summary of the financial crisis including an explanation of why the Fed bailed out Bear Stearns and AIG, while allowing Lehman Brothers to fail. Clearly, Chairman Bernanke thought that detailing policy action to college students would provide a non-threatening venue to explain controversial decisions and, while it was, it did little to restore credibility. During the first seminar he was asked if the Fed was to blame for the housing bubble and he said it was not. At subsequent seminars, he defended quantitative easing and continued to defend the possibility that additional quantitative easing may be needed. With that, speculation that the Fed was on the verge of additional stimulus returned. So much so, that on the eve of the April 2nd release of the detailed minutes of the March 13th meeting, consensus had again shifted to the conclusion that the release would detail how and when QE 3 would be implemented; despite the knowledge that the summary released weeks earlier had already dispelled that notion. Nonetheless, the capital markets were sent into a tailspin again when the minutes failed to detail any immediate plans and instead offered a mildly upbeat report. As if Fed credibility hadn’t been damaged enough, Charles Plosser, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia was quoted as saying just hours before the minutes were released “I think there’s a scenario where you could raise rates by the end of this year.” The year being 2012, not 2014! Keep in mind that these men and women gather in the same room every six weeks to discuss monetary policy.

Instead of explaining his case to impressionable college students and the former Junior Miss America, we’d like to see Bernanke confront someone with a firm grasp of money and banking. Just such an individual is Jim Grant, author of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer. Mr. Grant was invited to visit the Fed and express his criticisms to a representative of the Federal Open Market Committee. In a 3,700 word speech, Mr. Grant takes the Fed to task, writing that “What passes for sound doctrine in 21st-century central banking—so-called financial repression, interest-rate manipulation, stock-price levitation and money printing under the frosted-glass term “quantitative easing.” A quick “Google” search of keywords “Jim Grant crucifies the Fed” will take the reader to the entire speech, which is well worth the trouble.

As we’ve expressed on numerous occasions, we suspect that the Fed’s ability to maintain an artificially low interest rate is losing its effectiveness. With the economy well down the path of self-sustainability and inflation likely to push higher in the coming months, we expected that bonds will come under increasing price pressure.

February 2012

Despite the price weakness observed during the month, we continue to believe that U.S. Treasury interest rates remain artificially low and that corporate and municipal debt offers an attractive investment opportunity. To detail that thesis, we’ve prepared the following valuation discussion.

In its simplest form, valuation is the expected purchasing power (also known as the real rate of return) of a dollar invested in a bond at the end of a holding period, given the current interest rate and anticipated rate of inflation. The starting point for this exercise is the U.S. Treasury note, also known as the “risk-free” rate. Note that “risk-free” refers to credit-worthiness, not interest rate sensitivity. As Figure 1 illustrates, the risk-free Treasury rate can be described as a combination of the inflation rate and the real rate. In 2005, a 7-year Treasury note yielded 4.43%, but 3.40% of that yield was compensation for expected inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index. From that, the investor expected to be rewarded with 1.03% more buying power at the end of the one year holding period. The “rule of thumb” among bond investors is that a real rate of 1.0% is approximately fair value. At the end of 2005, one could conclude that the 7-year note in question was fairly valued. The circumstances today are much less favorable. With the 7-year note yielding 1.38% and inflation registering 3.0%, an investor holding the note for one year would realize 1.62% less buying power at the end the holding period. Using the 1% real return “rule of thumb,” the current 7-year note would need to rise to 4.0% to be considered fairly valued. Inputting that interest rate differential into a bond calculator delivers the astonishing conclusion that the price of the 7-year note is 15% overvalued.

Turning to the corporate bond market we employ a similar relative valuation technique to determine fair value. In this exercise we use the Barclays Capital U.S. Credit Index as a proxy for the corporate bond market. The index has interest rate sensitivity similar to the 7-year Treasury note. To assess value, we subtract the yield-to-maturity of the 7-year Treasury note just discussed from the yield-to-maturity of the index. The difference is defined as the credit risk premium, or the incremental return the investor expects for assuming credit risk over and above the risk-free Treasury note. In 2005, subtracting the 4.43% risk-free rate from the 5.30% yield-to-maturity of the index indicated that the credit risk premium was 0.87%. Again, using rule of thumb, fixed income investors would consider a risk premium of 0.87% to be a close approximation of fair value. Refocusing on the yield-to-maturity of the index at the end of February 2012, the credit risk premium stood at a significantly more attractive 1.68%. Returning to the bond calculator, we find that an investor would enjoy approximately a 5.5% appreciation in the price of the portfolio if that spread were to narrow from the current 1.68% to 0.87%.

Considering the two measures of valuation, an investor could conclude that assuming the risk of a 15% loss to achieve a 5.5% gain doesn’t make a lot of sense. After all is said and done, the outcome would result in an 8.5% loss. However, to offset the interest rate risk, we have positioned short interest rate hedges through the futures and options market. In doing so, we are attempting to profit from the relatively attractively priced corporate and municipal markets while neutralizing the downside risk inherent in U.S. Treasury notes.

January 2012

The storm clouds of worry that hung over the capital markets at year-end yielded to cautious optimism in January. Evidence of the improved sentiment could be found across nearly all asset classes. The S&P 500 index rallied more than 4% and the SPX volatility index (VIX) closed the month below 20% for the first time since June 2010. In the fixed income market, U.S. Treasury notes were largely unchanged while credit markets of all quality rallied.


The initial catalyst for the improved market tone was a reversal of the near-panic that gripped the markets as 2011 came to an end. That relief rally was buttressed by better than expected economic fundamentals. A robust manufacturing sector translated into better-than-expected sales of aircraft, machinery, electronics, and automobiles. Even more encouraging has been the improving employment situation. Investors were cheered by the 1.6 million non-farm payroll jobs gained in 2011. The just released jobs report for January was even more encouraging, with the economy adding a much better than expected 243,000 non-farm payroll jobs. Even more surprising was the 641,000 increase in employment, as measured by the Household survey. Regardless of the measure employed, job growth is strengthening and the “naysayers” forecasting a return to recession are dwindling in number.


However, not everyone is ready to signal the “all clear” yet, with the loudest and most consistent doubter being Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke. In what many deemed to be a foolish move, the FOMC released the interest rate and inflation forecasts of each Federal Reserve governor and president. From those forecasts, we found three inconsistencies. Immediately apparent is, despite Fed Chairman Bernanke’s proclamation to hold overnight rates at zero through 2014, it’s hardly a unanimous opinion. In fact, of the seventeen members polled, only six are forecasting such an outcome. Three of the forecasters are expecting a rate rise this year and six of them expect a rate hike sometime next year. Clearly, there is not a consensus within the Fed! Second, using a weighted average of the forecasts as the “best guess” forecast for interest rates, we believe that market-implied Fed Fund futures are too expensive, which is the rationale for why we have positioned them as part of our hedging strategy. Lastly, the Fed forecast, under each scenario is that inflation will rise to, but not above, 2.0%. Of the various measures of inflation, the Fed prefers the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) core index, which rose 1.8% YOY in December. However, the entire PCE universe increased 2.4% year over year for the same period. Before the Fed can maintain inflation below 2% they’ll need to first get it below that level. Given the excessively easy monetary policy currently in place and the promise to stay accommodative for years, the Fed is asking investors to suspend conventional wisdom in accepting their inflation forecast.


At the press conference following the FOMC meeting Chairman Bernanke stumbled when questioned about the impact of the zero interest rate policy on purchasing power in an environment of 2% inflation. Scott Spoerry from CNN asked “…There are people out there who are going to say the Federal Reserve have finally just admitted it. Their policy is to destroy 2 percent of the value of my dollars every year.”


One would think the Chairman would be prepared for such a “curve ball” and have a concise answer prepared. Instead, a clearly frazzled Bernanke delivered an inarticulate and nearly indecipherable response. The last few sentences, as per the Federal Reserve website, are as follows:


“I think the argument that, you know, the value of your dollar, the declines at 2 percent a year is not really a very good one unless you’re one of those people who does their lifetime saving in the mattress. Most people invest in various kinds of instruments receiving rate of interest. And now it’s true as been pointed out that for the moment that interest rates are pretty low they’re still positive but over a longer period of time if you–even if you have money in a CD or some other investment vehicle, the interest rate will compensate you for the–for inflation. I mean the two will be tied together. And so, they really shouldn’t be, you know, levels of inflation this low, interest rates should pretty much fully compensate for the losses to savers. But I would reiterate that we are not unaware of the problems that low interest rates cause for savers, cause for pension fund contributions, insurance companies, and other parts of the economy and we do try to take that into account as we think about other ramifications of our policy.”


It’s the assumption at Halyard that despite public attestations to the contrary, Chairman Bernanke is expecting inflation to rise and that interest rates will rise to levels in line with the elevated inflation rate.

December 2011

As we commence the New Year, our thesis has not changed from that which we held 12 months ago; namely, U.S. interest rates are artificially low and the U.S. economy is performing better than general consensus believes. To fully clarify where we find ourselves at this stage of the economic cycle, we’ll first examine the trading dynamics witnessed in the just concluded fourth quarter, followed by a discussion of our current positioning and expectations for the coming year.

Following a summer of frightening headlines foretelling the demise of the Euro, default by one or more sovereign nations, a credit rating downgrade of U.S. government debt, and a systemic collapse of the banking system, investors willingly ignored improving fundamentals and focused instead on the barrage of doomsday scenarios proffered by the print and broadcast media. As the year came to a close, the three biggest concerns were the “turn” effect, fear of a sovereign default-induced banking problem, and the misinterpretation of the success of “operation twist.”

The “turn” pertains to the concept that banks and financial institutions must be fully funded when they close the books for year-end, also known as the “turn” of the year. While I don’t recall a single instance when a bank or financial institution was unable to fund itself at year end it, nevertheless, is an annual folly that creates unnecessary nervousness in the short maturity bond market. However, with investors fearful of European bank-induced systemic risk, year-end funding concerns spread to the debt of the banking sector and weighed on bank bond prices into the final trading day of the year. So much so that money center bank paper with less than a year to maturity were readily trading with a yield-to-maturity in excess of 3.0%.

At the other end of the extreme, investors continued to demonstrate an insatiable appetite for U.S. Treasury notes. Particularly perplexing was the logic in buying Treasury notes with long dated maturities. Anecdotal evidence points to a misconception among investors that the current Federal Reserve open market operation, colloquially know as “operation twist,” is taking long maturity bond supply out of the market. In fact we believe that the exact opposite is the case. In January 2011, the supply of U.S. Treasury bonds with a maturity of 20 years or more totaled approximately $400 billion, according to Barclays Capital. Today, that number is now approximately $500 Billion, a 23% increase in supply. We commend the Fed on an excellent marketing job, but as the misconception is realized and supply continues to pile up in 2012, the Fed is not likely to be able to maintain a 30-year interest rate in line with or below the rate of inflation.

Looking forward, we find the international investment landscape to be similar to that which was in place in 2003. Then, as now, it seemed unlikely that Europe would be a principal driver of global economic growth. Aggressive investors were shunning the continent in favor of emerging markets, with particular focus on China. Investors were fascinated with the growth potential of the burgeoning middle class, and the corresponding profit opportunity that growth would offer. History has shown that a growing middle class is accompanied by an increased demand in everything from food and shelter, durable and non-durable goods, and luxury items. From that demand is born a virtuous cycle of economic growth and profit potential. Much of what was anticipated eight years ago has come to pass. According to Reuters, more than 13 million automobiles were sold in China last year, which is a 900% increase in sales compared to the 1.3 million units sold there in 2003. Growth of that magnitude can be found in broad aspects of the economy across the emerging markets. Certainly, the current challenge faced by the Chinese central planners to cool the property sector without stalling the economy is likely to prove a daunting challenge and one that has given investors pause. Perhaps even more damaging to investor confidence has been the numerous high profile accounting scandals that have surfaced in the last year. Holding aside the short-term policy tweaks of the Central Bank and the petty malfeaseance said to be inherint in small and medium sized business, the secular growth story that was expected to dominate the 21st century eight years ago is still very much alive and well. The only change is that in 2003 China enjoyed a foreign exchange reserve of $403 million. As of September 2011, reserves have ballooned to $3.2 trillion according to the State Administration of Foreign Exchange of the People’s Republic of China. With such a pool of reserves and a middle class growing by more than 10 million persons annually, one would expect China to drive economic growth for decades to come.

Given the scenario described above, we expect that European fiscal and balance sheet issues will continue to “spook” investors, but will not destabilize growth. The United States will likely continue to experience accelerating economic growth and falling unemployment, while the driver of the Global economy for the foreseeable future will be China. With that view, we’ve structured the portfolio to reflect three driving biases; overweight credit, long U.S. dollar, and avoidance of interest rate sensitivity.

In positioning for our bullish credit outlook, we’ve built an overweight exposure to U.S. bank and brokerage paper. While we anticipate that the sector will continue to be subject to headline risk and price volatility, we’re of the opinion that current valuations ignore the business risk reduction that has taken place in the sector since the financial crisis. Similarly, we favor Australian and Canadian banks for their conservative management and spread stability relative to risk free interest rates. Conversely, except for a select few names, we continue to avoid European banks.

Further expanding upon our credit bullishness, we continue to find exceptional value in both taxable and tax-exempt municipal bonds. At year end, our exposure to the municipal market had risen to 10% from 3.25% at the beginning of last year. The irony is that while municipalities have made steady progress in closing budget deficits and correcting flawed fiscal policies, municipal bonds continue to suffer from the “baby and the bath water” syndrome that has plagued the market for more than a year.

While our bullish credit view extends to a number of non-U.S. issuers, we do not favor investment in non-U.S. dollar denominated investments. At the commencement of 2011, a popular investment theme among strategists was investment in local currency denominated emerging market debt. The rationale hinged on a belief that countries like Brazil and Russia were in better fiscal shape than the U.S. and, hence holding bonds in those local currencies would offer the added value of currency appreciation and incremental yield. Advocates of the strategy became much less vocal as the year progressed and losses in the strategy began to mount. For the year, the Indian Rupee, lost 18%, the Brazilian Real and Mexican Peso both lost more than 12%, and the Russian Ruble lost more than 5%. As we’ve articulated previously, investment in fixed income instruments denominated in local currency result in “equity-like” risk for “fixed income-like” return. Currently, we see no opportunities in which both yield-to-maturity and currency valuation would prompt us to buy local currency-denominated emerging market debt. Similarly, for reasons discussed above, we are avoiding Euro-denominated debt as well. For the time being, we are staunchly dollar focused.

The mortgage backed securities (MBS) market falls solidly between our bullish and bearish call. With the risk of a possible sharp rise in rates looming, we deem mortgage-backed securities as being at an even greater risk to price deterioration. Due to the structure of mortgage-backed securities and the mathematics involved in pricing the securities, the price of MBS fall faster than Treasury securities in a rising rate environment. However, offsetting the rate rise risk is the ongoing speculation that the Fed is poised to launch QE 3, with the exclusive mandate of buying mortgage-backed securities. With that, we’re maintaining our MBS position for now, but will keep a watchful eye on the market for deterioration in the fundamentals.

Finally, we continue to view the short term interest rate hedge position as very attractive from a reward/risk tradeoff perspective because it affords us the opportunity to hedge the portfolio for very little cost through a short position in Fed Fund futures and interest rate options on LIBOR interest rates. Both Fed Fund and LIBOR interest rates continue to remain at rates very close to zero and do not expect this to change given the Federal Reserve’s pledge to keep interest rate near zero until at least mid -2013.

To conclude, as we evaluate the investment landscape for the coming twelve months, we believe the Halyard Fixed Income Fund is well positioned to perform as economic growth continues to expand, Europe continues on a path of slow but steady resolution to their debt and budget concerns, and investors develop a heightened appetite for risky assets and a distaste for U.S. government debt.

November 2011

Prior to the open of trading on the last day of the month, the Federal Reserve took action to extend swap lines and lower the interest rate on loans to the European Central Bank. The market interpreted the action as being positive for the stock market and negative for the bond market. Unfortunately, the positive price action was not captured in the monthly performance. The reason being, much of the spread improvement came over subsequent days. It happens quite often when there is a big move on the last day of the month, sometimes in favor of the fund, and sometimes against it. The impact was felt across many fixed income funds, including some of the third-party managers held in the fund.

From an economic perspective, the trend of improving activity seemed to accelerate in November. Both manufacturing and consumer consumption were significant drivers of activity. Manufacturing continues to enjoy a renaissance as outsourced industries bring production back to the United States and demand from developing economies for U.S. industrial and technological production surges. Similarly, retail sales registered strong results for the month, rising 0.5% month-over-month in October, with automobiles, electronics, and department store sales leading the way. Retail sales for November, to be released December 13th, are expected to post another strong gain. The “Black Friday” shopping madness shattered revenue records as shoppers lined up at midnight to capture deeply discounted merchandise. The shopping spree, anecdotally, seemed to continue right up to the close of business on Sunday evening. Piper Jaffrey estimated that Apple sold fifteen I-Pad’s per hour during the weekend. That translates into one I-Pad sold every four minutes. There is the risk that consumers will demand “Black Friday-like” discounts for balance of the holiday shopping season or that sales will slow. We don’t think either outcome is likely, as retailers entered the holiday season with lean inventory levels.

The most surprising bright spot was housing. While sales of new and existing homes continue to occur at an anemic pace, home prices showed an unexpected rise, jumping a surprising 0.9% month-on-month as measured by the FHFA home price purchase index. While it’s unlikely that price rise will be sustained, we view it as another indication that the worst is behind us and the housing market has either bottomed or is close to doing so. Given the above outlined scenario, we estimate that Q4 economic activity will top 3% when the measure is released in January 2012.

On a technical note, the Fed has eased interest rates twice in the last week. On November 30th, the Fed announced an expansion of their dollar swap trading with the ECB without indicating a cap on the program. On December 7th, it was announced that the size of the initial operation totaled more than $50 Billion. That’s far more than anyone was expecting. One could argue that it’s a Fed engineered ease for the European monetary system. Separately, it was disclosed yesterday that the Fed is participating in the Mortgage-Backed market through the purchase of newly issued securities in a technical operation known as a “dollar roll.” A dollar roll is similar to a Repurchase agreement or “Repo,” the Feds primary tool for easing interest rates. The operation involves the Fed buying securities while simultaneously agreeing to sell them back to the counterparty one month later. In effect, the Fed is injecting dollars into the monetary system, either temporarily or permanently, depending on what the Fed is trying to accomplish. With this latest operation, it seems as though the operation will remain in place, at least for the immediate future. The size of the operation hasn’t yet been disclosed, but this program could also be termed an easing. Finally, there’s growing talk that the Fed will cut the discount rate at the next FOMC meeting. Given that the Fed has not denied the possibility of the action, we assign a 50% probability to such an occurrence. The action is significant in that the Fed is further easing monetary policy as the economy is accelerating. We deem this to be an additional policy error that will be more problematic when the time comes to unwind it.

October 2011

Investors continued to grapple with exogenous events as volatility in the capital markets remained elevated throughout October. For much of the month, greed ruled as investors moved to buy equities amid a growing perception that the European Union had reached consensus to support the fiscally challenged members of the common currency. Indeed, approval of fiscal restraint by the Greek parliament was the catalyst for the 3.25% rally in the S&P 500 on October 27th. Unfortunately, the entirety of that one day move was undone two business days later when Prime Minister Papandreou vowed to hold a public vote on the newly approved package. In the United States, improving economic fundamentals and investor concern about the very low absolute level of interest rates resulted in the yield-to-maturity on the 10-year U.S. Treasury note rising approximately 20 basis during the month.

The 2.47% decline in price of the S&P 500 on the final day of the month obfuscated what was a surprisingly positive month of economic data and corporate earnings. Arguably the most surprising piece of data, 3rd Quarter GDP, was completely ignored by the market. Consider that just eight weeks prior to the release, consensus opinion was that the U.S. was sliding back into recession. None other than “Economist-in-Chief” Ben Bernanke, in August, communicated that the economy faced “significant downside risk.” To mitigate those risks, the Fed implemented the so-called operation twist, in which they sold government debt with less than five years to maturity and used the proceeds to buy long-term debt. Despite Chairman Bernanke’s dire forecast, gross domestic product expanded by a better than expected 2.5% for the quarter. Digging into the components of the report, the news was even brighter. Exports grew faster than imports, real final sales rose 3.6%, and Gross Private Investment rose 4.1%, as reported by the Commerce Department. Inventories were nearly unchanged for the period, which is a positive indicator of future growth. All things equal, inventories typically expand in step with the economy. If not, supplies decline forcing producers to increase production to restore depleted stocks.

Equally encouraging was the employment growth in October. The non-farm payroll rose 80,000 for the month which, at first glance, was not particularly impressive. However, the Bureau of Labor Statistics revised the number of workers hired in August and September by a total of more than 150,000. Recall that the August jobs report initially indicated that no jobs were added in August. Year to date, the U.S. economy has added in excess of 1.2 million jobs.

Against that backdrop the widening in credit spreads that occurred in August and September has persisted. To put that valuation in perspective, the current spread of the Barclays credit index stands at 189 basis points. That’s just 35 basis points below the widest level reached during the Enron/Worldcom corporate malfeasance era in 2002. With that, we now believe that rising interest rates and tightening credit spreads will likely come to pass.

September 2011

Financial anxiety remained elevated during September as evident in the hyper-volatility of the stock market, acute widening in credit spreads, sharp rally in the U.S. Dollar, and the continued flight to U.S. Government debt. Our opinion is that with stability returning to the stock market and bank rumors subsiding, the price of corporate bonds will swing from loss to profit.

A byproduct of the worry was the dramatic, broad-based market downturn in commodity prices, including oil and gold. The logic behind the commodity swoon was, if economic expansion slows, less discretionary income will be available for energy consumption and a corresponding fall-off of inflation would reduce demand for gold. Less apparent during the month was the significant widening in financial credit spreads. On the back of liquidity-related rumors, the yield-to-maturity for high profile names such as Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs rose to more than 5% for maturities of three years and longer. The paradox is that those three names have been specifically identified by the Federal Reserve as entities that are systematically important. Deemed “too big to fail,” those entities are subject to heightened scrutiny from the regulators with the intention of ensuring that failure is not possible. Nevertheless, in reaction to rumors, investors ignored balance sheet fundamentals and, instead, invoked the “sell first, ask questions later” tactic. Exacerbating the price weakness was the lack of secondary demand from Wall Street. A central tenant of Wall Street reform, known as the Volker Rule, is the abolishment of bank-related proprietary trading desks. In theory, the absence of a trading desk reduces the risk to the financial health of the bank due to swings in the market value of the instruments traded. The unintended consequence of closing those desks is heightened volatility. Historically, trading desks have provided liquidity during periods of market stress and, arguably, lessened volatility. Their absence, as witnessed in August and September, directly contributed to the weakness in corporate bond prices. From a trading perspective, we at Halyard view the market inefficiency that tends to result from heightened volatility as an opportunity over the long-term.

A perplexing characteristic of the current state of the economy is continued expansion in Gross Domestic Product despite the naggingly high rate of unemployment. Without a doubt, overall unemployment remains too-high by any standard. A disaggregation of the unemployment statistics yields a surprising outcome. This recession and subsequent expansion has been especially harsh on the lowest income earners and not nearly so for college educated adults. According to the Bureau of Labor statistics, the unemployment rate for adults that dropped out of high school and those with a high school diploma but no college is 14.0% and 9.7%, respectively. Those high school graduates with some college education are unemployed at an 8.4% rate, while the rate for adults with a college education is only 4.2%. At 4.2%, the rate of unemployment among college educated adults, the largest of four categories, has steadily fallen and is now the lowest it’s been in 2 ½ years. Moreover, the category of college educated individuals has grown by 10 million in the last decade, while the category of those not graduating from high school has declined by nearly one million. Because college educated individuals earn significantly more than their less educated counterparts, they have been the driver of economic growth during what has come to be called the jobless recovery. But that’s no solace for the approximately 50 million Americans with no college education, and especially the 5.2 million individuals in that category that are unemployed.

Looking forward, we are cautiously optimistic that the coming holiday selling season will be supportive of job growth and economic expansion. With that view, we have maintained our current position of overweight credit, minimal interest rate sensitivity, and hedged with options on short-term interest rates.

August 2011

Echoes of October 2008 were evident in the capital markets through much of August, as investors reacted harshly to ongoing deficit bickering in Washington and the downgrade of U.S. Government debt by Standard and Poor’s. While volatility was not near the level witnessed in the fall of 2008, the performance of the capital markets certainly felt similar in many ways.

The aggressive price-insensitive buying of Treasury notes continued and volatility in the equity market as represented by the VIX index averaged 32% for the month. While the temporary resolution of the debt ceiling issue offered a brief reprieve from the fear of U.S. default, that return to normalcy was short lived as Fed Chairman Bernanke confused the market with his speech at the Central Bank retreat at Jackson Hole Wyoming. In advance of the speech, consensus opinion was that Chairman Bernanke would announce some form of additional stimulus. Instead, he disclosed that the September FOMC meeting would be lengthened to two days giving the Fed time to discuss the need for additional stimulus and the manner in which such incremental stimulus would be implemented. However, since then, additional comments from members of the Federal Reserve Board indicate that it’s highly likely that the Fed will pursue some manner of additional quantitative easing. The most widely discussed tool is yield curve manipulation euphemistically named “operation twist.” The objective of operation twist is to artificially depress long-term interest rates through the direct purchase of U.S Treasury notes with maturities of more than 10 years. Still to be clarified is whether the Fed will purchase the long-dated notes with income from their existing portfolio of securities or will they sell shorter maturity securities out right to fund the purchase. As we’ve discussed in previous letters, we are not in favor of such manipulation of interest rates and are wary of the unintended consequences.

Another casualty of the investor nervousness was the high yield bond and bank debt market. The sectors were down 4.0% and 4.7% for the month, respectively, which was comparable to the nearly 6.0% loss incurred by the S&P 500. The high yield market, while technically categorized as fixed income, has a high correlation to the equity market during times of market stress. The rationale for the correlation is that weakness in stocks portends economic weakness which would likely result in heightened default risk to lesser-quality borrowers. The fund had no exposure to either sector as the month began, but we did make a 1% allocation to bank debt in the final days of the month. While it’s possible that it could experience additional price depreciation, we think current levels represent an attractive entry point.